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SOVIET USE OF INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

1. From the Soviet point of view, the international Communist fronts serve three basic purposes:

- As far as they are successful as "fronts", they reach segments of society closed to an explicitly Communist organization.*
- a. They make possible unity of action with non-Communist elements in order to exploit current issues and influence public opinion.
 - b. They provide vehicles through which national Communist parties can extend their local influence and receive material and organizational assistance and propaganda lines from the Soviet bloc and other Communist parties.
 - c. They provide a suitable environment for the cultivation, recruitment, and covert exploitation of agent personnel for both intelligence and political action purposes.

2. Since late 1957, in particular since November of that year, the international fronts appear to have four specific functions in support of current Communist strategy:

- a. To contribute, through unity-of-action campaigns in connection with the "struggle for peace", to the establishment of Communist influence over Socialist groups throughout the world.
- b. To generate in all strata of society in the West opposition to the strengthening of Western unity and to the nuclear deterrent strategy.

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c. At the regional level (particularly in the Afro-Asian and Latin American areas), to serve as the instruments through which Communist influence can infiltrate and manipulate national liberation and anti-Western forces, in order to induce local governments, especially in the independent countries, to shift from neutralism to a breaking of political and economic ties with the West, and to accept Soviet connections in their place.

d. To provide national Communist parties in the Afro-Asian and Latin American areas, and the specialized trade union (WFTU) and youth (WFDY-IUS) front affiliates, with coordinated programs of action and support. The generating of riots, demonstrations and violent clashes ~~by mass organizations~~ directed against pro-Western governments or local elements currently identified with the West appears to be a recommended tactic.

3. During 1956-57 the fronts appeared willing to make major concessions to non-Communist and even anti-Communist groups in order to achieve at least contact with leading representatives and active workers, but there is now evidence of a hardening of attitudes and an insistence upon certain minimal requirements ~~(set by the Communists, of course)~~ for the unity gatherings; *for example,* acceptance of Chinese Communist participation, or inclusion of certain organizations in which Communist influence is substantial. In the preparations for the 7th World Youth Festival to be held in 1959, the Bloc student and youth groups are less generous with economic aid to national delegations.